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Wicker: Criminal Procedure - The Coconspirator Exception to the Hearsay R
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-The Coconspirator Exception to the Hearsay Rule.
Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327 (Wyo. 1977).

Jasch and Jevne were codefendants charged with selling
marijuana. The events leading to their arrest began when
Jasch was introduced at a local bar to Ted Moore, an undercover agent and deputy sheriff. According to the testimony
of Moore, an arrangement was made for Jasch to sell a quantity of marijuana to Moore. A short time later Moore went to
a second bar where delivery was to take place. Jasch was not
present; but, Jevne approached Moore and said, "I have the
lid of grass from Jasch". They went into a restroom where
Jevne delivered the marijuana to Moore. There was no evidence presented as to whether or not Jevne asked for payment at the time he delivered the marijuana.
The prosecutions against the two defendants were consolidated for trial over Jasch's objections. Jevne exercised his
fifth amendment rights and elected not to testify at the trial.
Jasch objected to the introduction of Moore's testimony relating Jevne's declaration implicating Jasch. The trial judge
ruled it was hearsay as to Jasch, and instructed the jury to
disregard it in determining Jasch's guilt or innocence. Jasch
was found guilty by the jury of delivery of a controlled substance in violation of Section 35-347.31(a)(ii) of the Wyoming Statutes and sentenced.1
Jasch raised two issues on appeal: (1) He was prejudicially
joined for trial with codefendant Jevne, and (2) the statement made by the codefendant implicating him was constitutionally inadmissible. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that
the Bruton rule2 was not applicable to this case. In Bruton
the United States Supreme Court held:
[B] ecause of the substantial risk that the jury, despite
instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining the defendant's guilt, the admission of codefendant's extrajudicial confession in the joint trial violated defendant's
right of cross examination secured by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. 3
Copyright© 1978 by the University of Wyoming.

1.

2.
3.

WYO. STAT. § 35-347.31(a) (Supp. 1975) provides that it is "unlawful for any person to . . . deliver,.., a controlled substance." Marijuana is a schedule I controlled
substance. § 35-347.14(d)(10) (Sunn. 1975). The felony penalty of up to 10 years
imprisonment is provided by WYO. STAT. § 35-347.31(a)(ii) (Supp. 1975).
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), appeal after remand, 416 F.2d 310
(8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1014 (1970).
Id.
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The Wyoming Supreme Court said that Jasch v. State4 was
distinguishable because the declaration of the codefendant
was not a confession and the declaration was admissible because it was within the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
This note discusses the reasoning that led the Wyoming
Supreme Court to the correct conclusion that the Bruton
rule was inapplicable to this case. In addition, the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule will be discussed. The sufficiency of the independent evidence of conspiracy, necessary
to invoke the coconspirator rule, will be criticized, as will the
court's affirmance on these grounds since the coconspirator
exception was never before the trial court.
BACKGROUND OF THE LAW

The coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule5 is usually defined as "any act or declaration by one coconspirator
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and during its
pendency is admissible against each and every coconspirator
provided that a foundation for its reception is established by
independent proof of the conspiracy." '6 The early history of
admissions exceptions to the hearsay rule is unknown,' except they seem to have been around as long as the hearsay
rule itself. Probably they were originally not thought to be
hearsay and the rule simply was not extended to cover them. 8
One of the first articulations of the coconspirator exception
occurred during the English trial of Thomas Hardy for high
treason. Letters written by coconspirators in furtherance of
the conspiracy were admitted into eviderce against him. 9 Several American courts also made early use of this rule."0 However, the present coconspirator rule is usually said to have
originated with a United States Supreme Court decision by
4. Jasch v. State, 563 P.2d 1327, 1330 (Wyo. 1977).
5. The hearsay rule excludes out of court statements used as evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. Garland, The Coconspirator's Exception to the Hearsay Rule: ProceduralImplementation and Confrontation Clause Requirements, 63
J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 1, 3 (1972).
6. Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1159, 1161 (1954) [hereinafter

cited as Levie].

7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 1162.
Id.
Trial of Thomas Hardy, 24 How. St. Tr. 200, 451-453, 473-477 (1794).
Levie at 1162-1163 citing Patton v. Freeman, 1 N.J.L. (Cox) 113 (1791); Brouhton v. Ward, 1 Tyler 137 (Vt. 1801); Clayton v. Anthony, 6 Rand. 285 (Va. 1828);
Reitenbach v. Reitenbach, 1 Rawle 361 (Pa. 1829).
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Justice Story.1' Since that time the rule has become firmly
entrenched in American jurisprudence 12 and has been widely
used .1
Several theories are advanced in justification of this rule.
Because it was originally grounded in agency principles, many
courts still use this theory to explain the existence of the
rule. 4 Just as declarations by the agent, when acting within
the scope of his authority may be imputed to the principal,
so too are declarations of one coconspirator admissible against
all other coconspirators. 15 Strong criticisms of the agency
justification, 6 have led to the consideration of other theoretical justifications.
One such theory for the coconspirator exception is that
inculpatory declarations of a coconspirator are likely to be
trustworthy for the same reasons that indicate the reliability
of declarations against interest. 7 The idea is that sane men
do not falsely admit to participating in conspiracy and since
the interest of all conspirators is identical, an admission of
one coconspirator against his interest is also against the interest of the other coconspirators. 18 This theory, however, ignores the possibility that a coconspirator's aim may be to
mislead the listener, the coconspirators' various aims may be
different, and criminals are not particularly noted for their
veracity .19
A third justification is simply that coconspirators' declarations are admitted out of necessity because this is an area of
the law where proof is difficult.20 It is theorized that the
rules of evidence in the case of a conspiracy should be relaxed
because the potential harm from concerted action by a group
is potentially greater than that from a single individual and
the secret nature of a conspiracy presents problems of detec2
tion and proof. '
11. United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. 281 (1827).
12. Jasch v. State, supra note 4, at 1330.
13. 4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1079 (Chadbourn rev. 1972); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 267 (2d ed. 1972).
14.

Morgan, Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARV. L. REV. 462 (1929).

15.

United States v. Gooding, supra note 11; Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961

16.

(2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 702 (1926).
Levie, at 1164-1165; Note, Developments in the Law of Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L.

REV.920,989 (1959).
17.

4 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1080(a) (3d ed. 1940).

18. Levie at 1165.
19. Id. at 1166.
20.

Garland, supra note 5, at 2.

21.

Id.
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THE BRUTON RULE
Before the court in Jasch revealed why Jevne's statement
implicating Jasch was admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, it first turned to the task of showing why the Bruton rule 2 was not applicable to this case.
It has long been a theory in American courts that the
jury will and can follow the trial judge's instructions. "To
say that the jury might have been confused amounts to nothing more than an unfounded speculation that the jurors disregarded clear instructions of the court in arriving at the verdict. Our theory of trial relies upon the ability of a jury to
follow instructions." 23 It was originally thought that the risk
of possible prejudice against defendants from improperly admitted evidence can be sufficiently minimized by the court's
instructions to the jury. 4 In joint trials, post conspiracy declarations of one coconspirator, implicating the other coconspirators, have been admitted against the declarant only. If
the jury is clearly instructed as to this limitation, courts have
said there was no reversible error.1
Before the Bruton decision, the leading United States Supreme Court opinion on the subject of instructing juries to
disregard hearsay evidence as to certain codefendants was
Delli Paoli v. United States.2 6 Five defendants were convicted
in a joint trial of conspiring to deal unlawfully in alcohol.
The trial court admitted into evidence the extrajudicial confession, which implicated other codefendants, made by one
codefendant after the termination of the alleged conspiracy.
The Supreme Court said this was not reversible error because
the trial judge clearly instructed the jury that the confession
could only be used in considering the guilt of the confessor
and was to be disregarded in considering the guilt of the other
codefendants. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissenting opinion,
expressed misgivings that would be adopted by a majority of
the courts a decade later. "The fact of the matter is that too
22.

Bruton v. United States, supra note 2, at 126.

23. Opper v. United States. 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954); Blumenthal v. United States, 332
U.S. 539,559-60 (1947).
24. Cwach v. United States, 212 F.2d 520, 526-27 (8th Cir. 1954); United States v.
25.

Simone, 205 F.2d 480, 483-84 (2d Cir. 1953).
Blumenthal v. United States, supra note 23, at 559-560; Lutwak v. United States,
344 U.S. 604, 617-618 (1953); federal courts hold post conspiracy declarations are
hearsay except as to declarant. Lutwak v. United States, supra.

26. 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
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often such admonition against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a nonadmissible declaration
' 27
cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors.
In Jackson v. Denno28 a majority of the Court took cognizance of the fact that cautionary instructions by the judge
cannot effectively erase from the minds of the jurors evidence which is highly prejudicial to a defendant. The question before the Court was whether the voluntariness of his
confession had been properly determined. The New York
method was to submit the confession, the evidence as to the
voluntariness of the confession, and all the rest of the evidence to the jury. They were instructed that if they found
the confession to be involuntary, they were to disregard it.
The Court held that the risk was too great that the jury could
not free itself from believing the truth of the confession. This
would hamper their determination of the voluntariness of the
confession and if the confession was found to be involuntary,

it was doubtful the jury could disregard

it.29

0 relied heavily on
The Court in Bruton v. United Statess
its holding in Jackson. The same question was presented to
the Bruton Court as was before the Court in Delli Paoli. 31
Bruton and Evans were convicted by a jury in a joint trial for
armed postal robbery. A postal inspector testified that after
Evans' arrest, Evans orally confessed that he and Bruton had
committed the robbery. Evans did not testify at the trial. The
trial judge instructed the jury that Evans' confession could
not be used against Bruton because it was hearsay as far as
Bruton was concerned. Relying on Jackson, the Supreme
Court held that the risk that the jury looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements, despite the trial courts instructions to the contrary, in finding Bruton guilty was so
great that it constituted a violation of Bruton's right of cross
examination secured by the confrontation clause of the sixth
amendment.

Some commentators believe that the Bruton holding endangers the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. 2
27. Id. at 247.
28. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
29. Id. at 388-89.
30. Bruton v. United States, supra note 2.
31. Delli Paoli v. United States, supra note 26. (Delli Paoli v. United States was overruled by Bruton v. United States.)
32. Note, Bruton v. United States: A Belated Look at the Warren Court Concept of
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However, the Wyoming Supreme Court found that the Bruton rule was not applicable to Jasch.
OVERCOMING THE BRUTON RULE

A footnote in Jasch v. State made the point that some infractions of the Bruton rule were harmless error. 3a The majority of cases hold a Bruton error harmless when the admissible evidence against the defendant is so overwhelming that inadmissible evidence could have made no difference to the
outcome." Since the strongest evidence against Jasch was the
disputed declaration, if there was a Bruton error it could
hardly be considered harmless.
One reason the court gave as to why Bruton was not applicable to Jasch was that the utterance in Bruton was a confession while Jevne's statement was not." However, that
does not distinguish the cases significantly. The major concern
in Bruton was that the jury could not disregard the implicating statement, not the fact that the statement was a confession.M A Bruton error can come from statements other than
confessions.Y
The court's primary reason for holding the Bruton rule
inapplicable to Jasch was that Jevne's statement was within
the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, and as such
was not rendered inadmissible by Bruton.8 To analyze the
court's reasoning it will be temporarily assumed that the
court was correct in its classification of Jevne's statement.
The Wyoming Supreme Court first referred to a footnote
in the Bruton opinion, "There is not before us, therefore, any
recognized exception to the hearsay rule insofar as petition
is concerned and we intimate no view whatever that such exceptions necessarily raise questions under the Confrontation
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Criminal Justice, 44 ST. JOHNs L. REV. 54, 67-68, 74 (1969); Garland, supra note
5, at 15-22.
Jasch v. State, supra note 4, at 1330 n. 2.
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S.
250 (1969); James v. United States, 416 F.2d 467, 475 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 907, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 928.
Jasch v. State, supra note 4, at 1330.
"The primary focus of the court's opinion in Bruton was upon the issue of whether
the jury, in the circumstances presented, could reasonably be expected to have followed the trial judge's instructions." Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970).
United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
846 (1968); Shedrick v. State, 10 Md. App. 579, 271 A.2d 773, 776 (1970).
Jasch v. State, supra note 4, at 1330.
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Clause.""9 Clearly the court was correct in reasoning that
Bruton did not specifically intend to repudiate the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Evan's statement was
hearsay and inadmissible as to Bruton because it was a postconspiracy statement. Jevne's statement was admissible
against Jasch as an exception to the hearsay rule, if it could
be placed within the coconspirator exception.
To further buttress its argument, the court looked to
Dutton v. Evans.40 In Dutton, the codefendant made an extra-judicial statement after his arrest for murder in which he
implicated Evans. 41 The Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's admission of the testimony of the witness who heard
the implicating statement. They said the trial court was correct in finding the statement to be admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.42 As was correctly
ascertained by the Wyoming Court, Dutton shows that the
coconspirator exception lives on despite Bruton.43 The court
said in Jasch, "There is nothing in Bruton or Dutton giving
any hint that it would upset a doctrine that has prevailed for
years."" Other courts have reached the same conclusion."
It Looks Like a CoconspiratorException
The Wyoming Supreme Court ignored the trial court's
ruling that Jevne's statement was hearsay as to Jasch. The
Wyoming Supreme Court found that the statement met all
the requirements of, and was admissible as a coconspirator
exception to the hearsay rule.
Neither of the defendants was charged with conspiracy.
The court found the authorities in general agreement that
conspiracy does not have to be charged in the indictment to
allow an otherwise qualified extra-judicial statement to be ad39. Bruton v. United States, supra note 2, at 128 n. 3.
40. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
41.
42.

He said, "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be
in this now." Dutton v. Evans, supra note 40, at 77.
The Supreme Court said state courts could expand the coconspirator exception
into the post-conspiracy concealment phase, a practice not allowed in federal
courts. Dutton v. Evans, supra note 40.

43. The Dutton Court cited the same footnote from Bruton that the Wyoming court
44.

45.

did in Jasch v. State (see note 35). Dutton v. Evans, supra note 40, at 86.
Jasch v. State, supra note 4, at 1331.

McGregor v. United States. 422 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Littman, 421 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 19701; Note, The Admission of a Codefendant's Confession After Bruton v. United States: The Questions and a Proposal for their Res-

olution, 1970 DUKE L.J. 329, 342.
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mitted into evidence."6 This line of reasoning is substantiated
by the agency concept of the exception rule. In support, the
court stated that, although no conspiracy had been charged,
the state's case was "grounded on the same principles arising
' 47
from agency.
The court continued in its opinion to determine if the
three requirements of furtherance, pendency, and independent evidence of conspiracy had been met. The declaration of
48
the codefendant must be in furtherance of the conspiracy.
From the facts in the record it was obvious that if a conspiracy existed, Jevne's statement, that he had "the lid of grass
from Jasch," was in furtherance of it. There is also the rule
followed by all federal courts49 and most state courts 0 that
the statement must be made during the pendency of the conspiracy. Dutton allows state courts to admit declarations
made after the conspiracy has terminated and during the concealment phase. However, the Wyoming court made no ruling
as to whether or not it would restrict the use of the coconspirator exception to the active state of the conspiracy.51
Jevne's statement was made during the pendency of the conspiracy, so that requirement was fulfilled.
Finally, there must be evidence independent of the dec5
laration that a conspiracy or joint venture existed. 2 It is
widely held that the order of independent proof of the conspiracy is within the discretion of the trial judge. 3 The court
found that "[w]hile slight evidence of conspiracy is not
enough, prima facie evidence is sufficient. '5 4 The court approved of a definition of prima facie as " 'sufficient evidence
to permit the trial court reasonably to infer that there existed
46.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Jasch v. State, supra note 4, at 1332, citing Olweiss v. United States, 321 U.S. 744
(1944); see, United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1090 (1975); United States v. Snyder, 505 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 993 (1974).
Jasch v. State, supra note 4, at 1332.
Id. at 1332 citing McCormick, supra note 13, at § 267; see, Anderson v. United
States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974); Note, Developments in the Law of Conspiracy, 72
HARV. L. REV. 920,985 (1959).
Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
Some states also require the declaration made during the pendency of the conspiracy. State v. Speerschneider, 25 Ariz. App. 340, 543 P.2d 461 (1975); People v.
Anya, 545 P.2d 1053 (Colo. 1975).
Jasch v. State,supra note 4, at 1331.
See generally, Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 1148 (1972); Kessler, The Treatment of Preliminary Issues of Fact in Conspiracy Litigation:Putting Conspiracy Back into the
Conspiracy Rule, 5 HOFSTRA L.J. 77 (1976).
United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1975).
Jasch v. State,supra note 4, at 1334.
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a conspiracy.' "5 The Wyoming Supreme Court decided that
there was a sufficient amount of evidence independent of the
statement to meet this third requirement.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
The hearsay rule exists because it is felt that out-of-court
statements, where the declarant is not subject to cross examination, are generally untrustworthy. 5 Since statements allowed in through the coconspirator exception are subject to
the failings of hearsay, the independent evidence requirement
was established to improve their trustworthiness. 7 It is a protection for the defendant because "[o]therwise hearsay
would lift itself by its own bootstraps to the level of competent evidence." 5 8
The quantity of evidence of conspiracy required to allow
statements to be admitted under the coconspirator exception
is not easily determined. A very few courts have said that
only slight evidence of conspiracy is required 9 while some
courts, at the other extreme, require evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiracy.6 0 The Wyoming Supreme Court
correctly noted that the majority rule requires that independent evidence need only establish a prima facie case of conspiracy. "With little exception, the courts in the criminal
cases which have considered the question have held or recognized that the independent evidence must establish a prima
facie case of conspiracy."'"
Of course the problem remains as to what the court will
define as prima facie evidence. The most recent guidelines
from the United States Supreme Court came in United States
v. Nixon.6 2 The Court stated in a footnote that, "[a] s a preliminary matter, there must be substantial, independent evidence of the conspiracy, at least enough to take the question
6 Although there
to the jury." 83
is a question as to whether
this holding is binding on the Wyoming Supreme Court, most
55.

Id. citing State v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 139 N.W. 2d 490 (1966), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 317 (1966).
56. Garland, supra note 5, at 3.
57. Annot., 46 A.L.R. 3d 1148 (1972).
58. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1941).
59. Burns v. State, 72 Okla. Cr. 432, 117 P.2d 155 (1941).
60. United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1973).
61. Annot., 46 A.L.R. 3d 1148, 1161 (1972).

62. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
63. Id. at 701 n.14.
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courts do find that prima facie evidence is enough evidence
that a court of appeals would uphold the sending of the question of conspiracy to the jury. This requirement should not
be taken lightly as "[t] he sole restriction upon the use of
such devastating testimony is the preliminary fact requirement.""
The court listed the evidence it held was "more than adequate" 5 proof establishing a conspiracy. Specifically, it was
shown:
[1] Jasch and Jevne had been longtime friends. [2]
Codefendant was present in the first bar when Jasch
made the deal with the undercover agent. [3] Codefendant left the bar a few minutes before the defendant and the undercover agent. [4] Defendant was
paid for the marijuana. [5] A little later in the bar
that defendant had designated, codefendant had apand handed the undercover agent a
peared, possessed
66
lid of marijuana.
The fact of friendship is slim evidence for conspiracy.
Justice McClintock pointed out in his dissent that "mere association is not sufficient evidence of complicity. '6 7 The record shows that the presence of Jevne in the first bar where
the deal was made was in controversy. 68 Moore testified that
he saw Jevne there. Sam Cooper, a bartender who originally
introduced Jasch to Moore, was there with Jasch and Moore.
He testified that he did not see Jevne, whom he knew, even
though Moore said Jevne was where Cooper could see him.
There is no basis for the Wyoming Supreme Court to determine how the jury decided this factual dispute. In addition,
as noted earlier, 69 mere association is not adequate evidence.
The court also mentioned Jevne's departure right after the
sale had been arranged. This evidence is subject to the same
limitations as Jevne's presence in the bar. Additionally, there
was no evidence that Jasch and Jevne communicated with
each other at any time." Moreover, no evidence as to what
Kessler, supra note 52, at 82.
Jasch v. State, supra note 4, at 1334.
Id.
Id. at 1336 n.7. citing Glover v. United States. 306 F.2d 594 (10th Cir. 1962)
Panci v. United States, 256 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1958); See United States v. De Cicco, 435 F.2d 478,483 (2d Cir. 1970).
68. Jasch v. State, supra note 4, at 1339 (Justice Rose's dissent).
69. See note 67.
70. Jasch v. State, supra note 4, at 1339.
64.
65.
66.
67.
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transpired between Jevne and Moore at the time of the delivery of the marijuana was introduced. 71 Perhaps Jevne asked
for payment, or perhaps he negotiated his own arrangement.
The main point is that there does not really appear to be
"substantial independent evidence"72 of a conspiracy without
the statement by Jevne.
No Consideration by the Trial Court
At no time did the trial court consider the existence of a
conspiracy or the admission of ostensible hearsay evidence
73
through the use of the coconspirator exception.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has said that it generally
74
does not consider issues not raised in the trial court.
This court is primarily a court of review, except in
cases in which this court has original jurisdiction or
where a constitutional question is legally certified to
this court. It is not its function to determine the facts
instance. That must
and the law in a case in the
5 first
be done by the trial court.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has taken upon itself in this
case to decide questions of fact and law that were never before the trial court. The court recently repeated that this is
not its function.
Counsel's arguments disclose only that there existed a
situation where the basic and determinative facts
were in direct dispute, requiring findings of fact and
application of legal principles by the district court.
For us to decide these questions of fact would make
this court the original trier of fact,76 a role which we
have consistently refused to assume.
In Jasch the Wyoming Supreme Court had to make a finding
of fact. It had to determine that the independent evidence of
conspiracy was sufficient to allow admission of Jevne's statement into evidence. In the face of contradictory testimony,
71. Id.
72. United States v. Nixon, supra note 62.
73. Jasch v. State, supra note 4, at 1337.

74. Mercer v. Thorley, 48 Wyo. 141, 43 P.2d 692 (1935).
75. Buckman v. United Mine Workers of America, 80 Wyo. 199, 339 P.2d 398, 402
76.

(1959), rehearingdenied, 342 P.2d 236 (1959).
Bard Ranch Co. v. Weber, 557 P.2d 722, 730 (Wyo. 1976); Mader v. James 546
P.2d 190 (Wyo. 1976); Knudson v. Hilzer, 551 P.2d 680 (Wyo. 1976).
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the trial court can better determine the facts because it sees
and hears the witnesses.
The overwhelming majority of authorities hold that either
the trial judge or the jury must determine the sufficiency of
the independent evidence of a conspiracy.77 The Court in
United States v. Nixon stated, "[w] hether the standard has
been satisfied is a question of admissibility of evidence to be
decided by the trial judge."7' 8 Even the authorities the Jasch
opinion cited to determine the amount of independent evidence necessary said it was a matter for the trial court to determine .9
Justice Rose, in his dissent, suggested it should be assumed
the trial judge knew the relevant law while making his rulings
unless it is shown otherwise.80 The trial judge had ruled that
Jevne's statement was hearsay as to Jasch, and so instructed
the jury. This necessarily implies that the judge did not find
the statement was admissible under the coconspirator exception. 81 A trial court's judgment cannot be disturbed except
on clear grounds.8 2 Because there was only slight evidence of
a conspiracy, the trial court's ruling as to the statement being
hearsay should not have been disturbed.
CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Supreme Court correctly concluded that
the Bruton rule does not apply to the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. This is even more important because
Wyoming has recently enacted a conspiracy statute8 3 and
there is no interpretive Wyoming case law. Furthermore, the
court will likely hold that the other exceptions to the hearsay
rule also survive Bru ton.
The court basically stated the coconspirator exception to
the hearsay rule in accordance with the majority of other
courts. This too will be significant in conspiracy cases. The
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slight amount of evidence of conspiracy it found to be sufficient might also affect future cases. This low level of evidence
could indicate that not many convictions will be overturned
on this point.
The Wyoming Supreme Court ignored totally all the authorities that hold a trial court determination on admissibility
is necessary. Combined with the slight amount of evidence
required, this could mean that the protective requirement of
independent proof of conspiracy means little in Wyoming.
The court should have remanded the case to the trial
court for a finding on the coconspirator exception. If the
trial court found there was sufficient independent evidence
of conspiracy, then the conviction could be affirmed. However, if the statement was still hearsay as to Jasch, then the
holding in Bruton would require a new and separate trial for
Jasch. The United States Supreme Court in similar circumstances granted a remand for a factual finding in Jackson v.
Denno.84 The Court held that when pure factual considerations became an important ingredient, appellate review could
not substitute for a full hearing and determination in the trial
court.
W. CHRIS WICKER

84. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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